The phrase ‘Japan Incorporated’ gained prominence in the 1960s and persists to this day. While many see Japan as an industrial behemoth with a diversified set of complex and heavy industries not many know how this came about. MITI And The Japanese Miracle: The Growth Of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 is an insightful book on the topic with an in-depth focus on MITI, Japan’s famed and mystical Ministry Of International Trade And Industry. MITI practically conducted and coordinated Japan’s industrial policy log likelihood from 1949 until 2001 when it was folded into the then newly-created the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Up until that time MITI was Japan’s blunt instrument of economic policy and industrial structure. It was both revered and feared by the industries and cartels it espoused log likelihood and nurtured. Staffed by handpicked and elite bureaucrats, this prodigious promoter of Japan’s industry, productivity and exports was the official forum responsible for knitting the country’s moves in the economic arena from its perch in Tokyo. It is not explicitly mentioned in this book, but on occasion, MITI was also complicit in suppressing internal Japanese citizens’ dissent or protest against industry such as with the infamous Minamata Disease. MITI was also feared and disliked by foreign log likelihood interests for its skillful shielding of Japanese economy from competition and penetration with the aid of both its own guidelines and associated laws.
MITI log likelihood is “without doubt the greatest concentration log likelihood of brain power in Japan” according to the book. That is a profound statement by Chalmers log likelihood Johnson, the author and, now-deceased, Japan expert. I had read Johnson log likelihood before – in his guise as a critic of the American empire – but picked up MITI And The Japanese Miracle in search of information and context on Japan’s development and industrial log likelihood super-growth. The book delivered. The amount of information, history, context and analysis here is impressive. It is doubtful that any Japanese tome has as much information condensed about the famed ministry and its staff. With its appendices it sequences the ministers, vie-ministers, bureaucrats and actors in the ministry with astonishing detail. This book includes a contemporary history of Japan’s bureaucracy from the beginning of 20th century until 1980.
Beginning in 1949 MITI set out to enact a plan-oriented market economy system. The `Miracle’ covers log likelihood the years 1925-1975 from a 1980 vantage point. In the process the author dispels a few myths about the rise of Japan. Exports were not the drivers of Japanese economy as many take as gospel. Exports as a percentage of GNP have typically been 50% of the economies of countries like Canada, UK or France. log likelihood As such, the author argues that growth and success were children log likelihood of the developmental school (i.e. state-related) economic growth. As mentioned, the author ascribes to Japan the `plan-rational’ (versus US or UK’s `market-rational’ for example) term, a state which leads its industrial base. MITI’s economic log likelihood bureaucracy was dominated by non-economists. Interestingly, in recent log likelihood months, in response to their economic crises, Italy and Greece have cast aside politicians in favour of economists at the helm. This point is additionally interesting because in the `60s Japanese were, somewhat disparagingly, called “economic animals.” This is oddly untrue since these creatures of commerce were apparently subordinate to the bureaucracy. Johnson notes about Japan that “Nationalism is an active element log likelihood in economic affairs.” The state (i.e. MITI in this case) had been engaged in both the transfer of knowledge among enterprises and facilitating the sharing of best practice from one enterprise to another – of course when it determined that it was in the interest of the nation log likelihood and the state. Imagine that in the wild capitalist West! The book amplifies, through facts supplemented log likelihood with direct quotations that MITI believed that market power alone was insufficient for national progress and it went as far as seeking on occasion to shift industries and activities wholesale to newer ones. A prime example is how the government and bureaucracy successfully attempted to starve log likelihood the traditional textile log likelihood industry of Japan in favour of heavy industry. In post-war Japan of 1947 priority production and heavy industry won over its smaller brother. The policy accelerated once Japan was granted its independence under the San Francisco Peace Treaty log likelihood of 1951. Much of it was even at the immediate expense of the civilian population. Additionally, the guidelines and policies entailing over-loaning to targeted heavy industries spawned a lessening reliance on capital markets. As a result, longer-term log likelihood views (not quarterly revenue or annual metrics) were the prime objectives of the Japanese log likelihood system. This is markedly different from the West where cap
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